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amount to a "virtual celebration of public regula-

The First Amendment is the immune system of
the body politic. Just as the AIDS crisis has taught
the tragic and sobering lesson that damage to the
body's natural defenses leaves it susceptible to
contagion from a wide variety of sources, the culture of regulation associated with electronic media makes the concept of free speech vulnerable
to bureaucratic manipulation. Censorship is contagious, and experience with this culture of regulation teaches that regulatory enthusiasts herald
each new medium of communications as another
opportunity to spread the disease.
The First Amendment commands that Congress shall make no law abridging freedom of
speech or of the press, but the courts historically
have allowed a greater degree of governmental intervention with respect to broadcast content than
with traditional print media on the theory that
"differences in the characteristics of new media
justify differences in the First Amendment standard applied to them."' As the Supreme Court
stated in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC,
"[b] ecause of the scarcity of radio frequencies,
the Government is permitted to put restraints on

tion"3 representing "[n]othing less . . . than a

complete conceptual reordering of the relationships between the government, the press and the
public that was established with New York Times v.
Sullivan."4 To read cases like Red Lion is to "step
into another world," where the press itself represents the greatest threat to First Amendment values, and government intervention in editorial
choices is the preferred method of salvation.5 It is
a vision of the First Amendment, in the words of
the late Supreme Court Justice William 0. Douglas, "that is agreeable to the traditions of nations
that never have known freedom of press."6
Alarm about the transformation of the First
Amendment from individual liberty to "collective
right" has been moderated somewhat by the
thought that the system damage was quarantined
to the broadcast industry. Thus, Dean Bollinger
championed what he called a "partial regulatory
system,"7 in which limited control over broadcasting content was constitutionally acceptable, so
long as it was not too aggressive and traditional
media remained fully protected." The balance
struck by this theory was based on the understanding that the Federal Communications Commission ("FCC" or "Commission") has "been extraordinarily circumspect in the exercise of its powers"9
(except in the regulation of "indecency," where it
has "seriously ignored important free speech interests") 10 and that preserving an "unregulated
sector" would maintain a check on government

licensees in favor of . . . [the public's] collective

right to have the medium function consistently
with the ends and purposes of the First Amendment. "2
This difference in treatment carries significant
constitutional ramifications. As Dean Lee Bollinger has noted, the Supreme Court decisions regarding broadcasting and the First Amendment

6 CBS v. Democratic Nat'1 Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 163
(1973) (Douglas, J. concurring).
7 BOLLINGER, at 142.
8 BOLLINGER, supra note 3, at 133-51. See also Lee C. Bollinger,Jr., Freedom of the Press and PublicAccess: Toward a Theory
of PartialRegulation of the Mass Media, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1
(1976).
9 BOLLINGER, supra note 3, at 115.
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3 LEE C. BOLLINGER, IMAGES OF A FREE PREss 71 (Univ. of
Chicago Press) (1991).
4 Id. at 66.
5 Id. at 72.
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Concern also was minimized because the patient was promised a full recovery. The intrusions
permitted by Red Lion were not enshrined as immutable principles of constitutional law, but were
intended to last only until, as the old joke goes,
"til the government needs glasses." The Supreme
Court noted that "because the broadcast industry
is dynamic in terms of technological change[,] solutions adequate a decade ago are not necessarily
so now, and those acceptable today may well be
outmoded ten years hence."' 2 The constitutional
balance that Red Lion struck was based on "'the
present state of commercially acceptable technology' as of 1969."13 As the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the D.C. Circuit found, "[i]t may well be that
some venerable FCC policies cannot withstand
constitutional scrutiny in the light of contemporary understanding of the First Amendment and
the modern proliferation of broadcasting outlets." 4
President Clinton underscored this point when
he described the differences between the constitutional treatment of broadcasting and the print
media shortly before last November's election:
As you know, the distinction between broadcasting and
publishing in terms of the First Amendment is based on
the scarcity principle. Free over-the-air broadcasting
will continue to be a vital part of our media, and availability of licenses will continue to be limited. When that
changes, the distinction between broadcasting and
print will change too.15

Passage of the Telecommunications Act of 1996
promised to eliminate this constitutional anomaly
and restore traditional First Amendment understandings. As the first comprehensive rewrite of
communications law in over six decades, the law
was intended to remove regulation and free up
competition. The Senate Report on the legislation noted that "[c] hanges in technology and consumer preferences have made the 1934 [Communications] Act a historical anachronism." It noted
that "the Act was not prepared to handle the
growth of cable television" and that "[t] he growth
of cable programming has raised questions about
Id. at 33, 97, and 114.
CBS Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. at 102
(1973) (Douglas, J. concurring).
News Am. Publ'g. v. FCC, 844 F.2d 800, 811 (D.C. Cir.
13
1988) (quoting Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 388); see Meredith Corp.
Co. v. FCC, 809 F.2d 863, 867 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
14 Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082, 1100 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
15
Clinton on Communications, BROADCASTING & CABLE,
11
12
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the rules that govern broadcasters" among
others.' 6
The House of Representatives' legislative findings were even more emphatic. The House Commerce Committee pointed out that "[t]he audio
and video marketplace ... has undergone significant changes over the past 50 years and the scarcity rationale for government regulation no
longer applies."1 7 The Committee Report noted
that there are more than 11,000 radio stations
and 1,100 commercial television stations - a 30%
increase over the past decade. During this time, a
fourth broadcast network came into existence,
and two other networks are emerging. The Report also pointed to additional competition from
cable television. It stated that cable systems
passed more than 95% of television households
and that 63% subscribe. In addition, it pointed to
"other technologies such as wireless cable, lowpower television, backyard satellite dishes, satellite
master antenna television service and VCRs, [all
of which] provide customers with additional program distribution outlets that compete with
broadcast stations."' 8 Finally, the Report pointed
to the strong interest by telephone companies in
providing video programming. "This explosion of
programming distribution sources," the House
Report found, "calls for a substantial reform of
Congressional and Commission oversight of the
way the broadcasting industry develops and competes."19
President Clinton signed the Telecommunications Act into law on February 8, 1996, appearing
to give life to pronouncement from his 1996 State
of the Union Address that "the era of big government is over."
PROMISE VERSUS PERFORMANCE
Like many vices, however, the government's
penchant for tinkering with the editorial decisions of broadcasters and others has proved hard
to break. The details of the Telecommunications
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Act, as well as a number of FCC actions over the
past year, demonstrate that the government has
no intention of letting go of its bad habits. Quite
to the contrary, new regulatory proposals are
emerging as if fueled with the hormonal intensity
of an adolescent's sex drive.
Despite the general characterization of the
Telecommunications Act as a deregulation measure, every provision of the new law that relates to
speech content is re-regulatory. Under Title V of
the law, the so-called Communications Decency
Act, the new law implements the V-chip scheme to
regulate television content, imposes onerous
scrambling and time-shifting requirements on
"adult" video services and adopts the notorious
Exon amendment, which purports to regulate "indecent" speech in the on-line context. In addition, the Telecommunications Act requires the
FCC to establish regulations and implementation
schedules requiring closed captioning for video
programming. 20
Such regulatory initiatives are by no means limited to the Telecommunications Act. Last August,
the FCC adopted rules that, in essence, require
television stations to transmit three hours per
week of programming "specifically designed to
serve the educational and informational needs of
children."2 1 Under this rule, the government directed that qualifying programming must be aired
between the hours of 7 a.m. and 10 p.m., regularly scheduled at least weekly, and be at least
thirty minutes in length. The educational or informational objective and the target child audience, must be specified in writing by the broadcaster in advance, and the licensee must list such
"core" educational shows in programming guides.
As the FCC explained it, the new rules were
designed "to reduce the role of government in enforcing compliance." 2 2
In addition to the children's television rules,
other content regulations have emerged as the focal point of federal broadcasting policies. In
many cases, regulatory initiatives begin as sponta-

neous private efforts and evolve into bureaucratic
expectations. For example, during the 1996 election cycle a number of broadcast licensees, led by
the Fox Network, announced that they would provide free television time for presidential candidates. To some federal officials, this seemed to be
such a good idea that they suggested it would also
be good law. 23
FCC Chairman Reed Hundt, for example, in
announcing the offer of free time by television
group owner A.H. Belo, suggested that free time
for political debate is a "key part of the social
compact between broadcasters and the public." 24
Chairman Hundt compared the United States unfavorably with other nations that require "massive
amounts of free time on media for direct communications between candidates and the public,"
and advocated the adoption of quantitative requirements to be imposed on broadcasters. He
had previously advocated setting aside five percent of digital spectrum authorizations for political and educational programming, and suggested
that the government should be "embarrassed" for
asking so little.25
Chairman Hundt similarly has advocated withholding or conditioning regulatory approvals for
other licensing matters upon broadcaster pledges
of government-approved programming. In early
1996, for example, the FCC denied several ownership waiver requests that were part of the Disney
merger with Cap Cities/ABC. It had earlier
granted similar waivers in the CBS/Westinghouse
merger, after Westinghouse pledged to provide
three hours per week of educational programming.
Just before the vote on the ABC transaction,
Chairman Hundt noted that "[i]f Disney had
committed to provide over the ABC Network, in a
reliable guaranteed manner, the same amount of
children's educational programming it now provides over [its Los Angeles station], I would have
taken that into serious account in considering
whether to grant these waivers." 2 6 Chairman

20
See generally Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56.
21
In re Policy and Rules Concerning Children's Television Programming, Report & Order, 11 F.C.C. Rcd. 10,660,
para. 1 (1996).
22
Id. para. 3.
23
Harry A. Jessell, Hundt Callsfor Free Time, BROADCASTINC, & CABLE, Sept. 30, 1996, at 26.
24
Chairman Hundt Says More Campaign Free Political Time

and Direct Communications Between Candidates and Public is
Needed, Unofficial Announcement of Commission Action, at
1 (Sept. 24, 1996) (transcript available at the FCC).
25 Reed E. Hundt and Karen Kornbluh, Renewing the Deal
Between Broadcastersand the Public:RequiringClearRules for Children's Educational Television, 9 HARv. J.L. & TECH. 11, 16-17
(Win. 1996).
26 FCC Open Meeting (Feb. 8, 1996) (video tape available at the FCC).
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Hundt added, "[w] e know how to take account of
promises to provide public interest programming."
As they used to say in the movies, "we have ways
of making you talk."
The Chairman further advocated making such
deals standard agency practice. "I think we
should consider revising our ownership rules so
that broadcasters will have incentives to provide
public interest programming," he said. "Why
shouldn't our rules contain clear and predictable
and reliable guidelines that will cause us to grant
ownership waivers to broadcasters in return for
their commitment to provide concrete amounts
of public interest programming that the market
under-provides such as children's educational
programming and free air time for political candidates?" 27 Generally, Chairman Hundt has advocated "reinventing the social compact," claiming
that "it is going to be necessary to quantify public
interest obligations."2 8 He has described the advent of digital broadcast technology as an "opportunity to order up from a wish list what we think is
best for the country." 29
A CULTURE OF REGULATION
The current reemphasis on content-based regulation of the media oddly reverses a traditional
presumption underlying federal controls. Broadcast licensing was deemed to be necessary because
of the economic and technological factors unique
to broadcasting. Consequently, in NBC v. United
States,30 the Supreme Court held that, because the
economic regulation of broadcasting was necessary, the FCC could also exert some control over
broadcasting content.31 The Telecommunications Act of 1996, however, takes the opposite approach. The Act is based on the premise that economic regulation is less necessary, that we have
entered an era of media abundance and that marketplace forces should replace regulatory commands. In the past, the FCC, backed by the
Id.
Chairman Reed Hundt, Reinventing the Social Compact,
Address at the BROADCASTING & CABLE Interface Conference
(Sept. 24, 1996) (transcript available on-line, (visited Apr. 1,
1997) <http://www.fcc.gov/Speeches/Hundt/spreh637.
txt>).
29
Gary Abrams, Censor Chip?, CAUFORNIA LAw BUSINESS,
Mar. 18, 1996, at 20, 21.
319 U.S. 190 (1943).
30
27
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Supreme Court, has considered such conditions a
reason to reduce content controls over licensed
media.3 2 Now, however, content controls have
taken center stage even as economic regulation
has begun to wither away (at least in theory). This
is the culture of regulation.
Not only has the demand for content regulation intensified, it is extending beyond broadcast
television. Key regulatory provisions of the Communications Decency Act,3 3 including the V-chip
and closed captioning requirements apply to
cable television and other video providers in addition to broadcast television. More importantly,
the Act's regulation of on-line "indecency" has
nothing to do with television, except for borrowing its regulatory justifications, and applies to a
medium of abundance, not of scarcity. In other
words, the types of speech regulation that represent "a complete conceptual reordering between
the government and the press and a "virtual celebration of public regulation" have broken free of
their broadcast moorings and are being applied
to all electronic media.
It is not necessary to read between the lines to
see this trend. The 1992 Cable Act requires direct
broadcast satellite providers, who may transmit
hundreds of video channels, to set aside four to
seven percent of their capacity for "noncommercial programming of an educational or informational nature."3 4 The United Court of Appeals for
the D.C. Circuit rejected a facial challenge to this
provision, uncritically accepting the continuing
validity of Red Lion.
FCC Chairman Hundt has been quite clear in
promoting the culture of regulation. In a speech
last fall he said that it is "reasonable to put all media under some obligation to serve the public interest. Indeed, all media have typically been party
to some sort of social compact."3 6 He referred to
the 4 to 7% set-aside for DBS, as well as obligations imposed on cable operators because of their
use of public rights-of-way. The obligations include leased access requirements, set-asides for
Id.
FCC v. WNCN Listeners Guild, 450 U.S. 582 (1981).
33 47 U.S.C.A. § 609 (West. Supp. 1996).
34
47 U.S.C. § 335(b) (1) (1994).
35 Time Warner Entertainment Co. v. FCC, 93 F.3d 957,
977 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
36 Chairman Reed Hundt, Reinventing the Social Compact,
supra note 28.
31

32
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public, educational, and governmental channels
and must carry obligations. One reason he advocated imposing regulations on all media is that
"[i]t isn't fair or sustainable to put obligations on
broadcast and cable that cannot be sustained
amid the increasing competition among broadcast, cable, DBS, LMDS, [and] wireless cable."
Consequently, government control should apply
to all, and "it is going to be necessary to quantify
public interest obligations."3 7
TARGET: INTERNET
It is clear, then, that the debate over the future
of broadcast regulations has ramifications far beyond that medium. For example, what effects
might there be on the Internet and the World
Wide Web, "a unique and wholly new medium of
worldwide human communication?"3 8 Judge Stuart Dalzell has described the Internet as "a neverending worldwide conversation," the "most participatory form of mass speech yet developed."39
Given the nature of the new medium, what possible rationale exists for imposing content controls?
The short answer to this question is contained
in the Communications Decency Act and its legislative history, in which Congress concluded that
the constitutional rationale for radio regulation
embedded in FCC v. Pacifica Foundation,4 0 applies
equally to a medium of unlimited abundance.
Two federal district courts thus far have disagreed with this approach, but the matter will be
resolved by the Supreme Court this year. 41 It is
important to understand, however, that litigation
over the constitutionality of the Communications
Decency Act is only one skirmish in what will be a
long, drawn-out campaign. The culture of regulation already is marshaling its forces for a multifaceted assault on Internet freedom.
Take, for example, the FCC's justification for its
children's television rules. Pointing to the government's interest in the well-being of youth, and
Id.
ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 844 (E.D. Pa. 1996)
(Dalzell, J.).
39
Id. at 883.
40 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
41
ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 883; Shea v. Reno, 930 F. Supp.
916 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
42
Chairman Reed Hundt, Address at the WALL STREET
JOURNAL Business and Technology Conference (Sept. 18,
1996) (transcript available at the FCC); Chairman Reed
Hundt, Competition: Walking the Walk and Talking the Talk, Ads7
38
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judicial approval of indecency regulations in
Pacifica and its progeny, the Commission concluded that it is not limited to shielding children
from "inappropriate" programming; it may also
constitutionally compel "appropriate" programming. If some measure of governmental authority
ultimately is upheld for regulation of "indecency"
on the Internet under a Pacifica rationale, does
this mean that the government may also compel
beneficial speech on that medium?
Advocates of regulatory culture seem to think
so. Chairman Hundt has discussed the possibility
of extending the Universal Service Fund (which
subsidizes the availability of telecommunication
services) to supporting Internet services. 42 Presumably, doing so would be a federal "benefit" for
Internet service providers that would establish a
"social compact" between the government and
service providers. For example, Chairman Hundt
has cited the children's television precedent and
free time offers for political broadcasting and
called upon Internet access providers to "give
some thought to their abilities to contribute to
the public good."4 3 Pointing to the $10 billion
price tag associated with wiring the schools for Internet access, he said it "may seem like a big
number but it's actually less than two tenths of
one percent of the revenues of the information
technology industry." 44 He concluded: "[T]here
is no more appropriate time ..

. to think about

renewing the social compact between the communications industries and the public." 45
The history of broadcast regulation suggests
that such a "compact" would bring with it "enforceable public obligations" that extend beyond
the current "requests" for educational services.
Indeed, some theorists steeped in regulatory culture have advocated imposing the FCC's political
broadcasting rules on on-line services.4 6 Some influential lawmakers already seem willing to go
even further, and are not waiting for any new rationale. Key legislators, including John Dingell
dress at the Media & Communications 96 Conference (Sept. 17,
1996) (transcript available at the FCC).
43 Chairman Reed E. Hundt, Children and the Information
Superhighway:Directionsfor the Future,Address at the Children's
Now Conference (Sept. 27, 1996) (transcript available at the
FCC).
44

Id.

Id.
Angela J. Campbell, Political Campaigning in the Information Age: A Proposalfor Protecting Candidates' Use of On-Line
Computer Services, 38 VILL. L. REv. 517 (1993).
45
46
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and Edward Markey (the father of the V-chip)
have opposed legislation that would exempt the
Internet from FCC content regulation. Congressman Markey has stated that the Internet should
not be given special status and that services provided over the medium should be regulated in the
same manner, and to the same degree, as services
offered by other media. Congressman Dingell,
pointing to the possibility of "cable programming
over the Internet," said he opposed any measures
that would "preclude the FCC from applying local
franchising requirements to the Internet."47
Any observer who doubts the direct connection
between advocacy of direct censorship and that of
warmer and fuzzier sounding public interest commitments should listen more closely to the advocates of regulatory culture. The Family Research
Council, a pro-censorship organization, described
the Communications Decency Act as "a once-in-ageneration opportunity to set ground rules for
the next great communications medium." 48
In an eerie parallel, FCC Chairman Hundt described the advent of digital broadcast spectrum,
which ultimately will merge computers with
broadcasting, as "a once-in-a-generation opportunity to order up from a wish list what we think is
best for the country." 49 The relative attractiveness
of wish lists, like beauty in general, is in the eye of
the beholder. Regardless of ideological differences between liberals and conservatives, however, there really is only one wish - to control the
medium.
REGULATORY CULTURE VERSUS
TECHNOLOGIES OF FREEDOM
First Amendment visionary Ithiel de Sola Pool
wrote fourteen years ago in his classic work Technologies of Freedom that "computers [will] become
the printing presses of the twenty-first century"
and that "[n]etworks of satellites, optical fibers
and radio waves will serve the functions of the
47

Ted Hearn, Internet Regulation in On Hill Agenda, MUL
Sept. 23, 1996, at 80. The House Subcommittee on Telecommunications and Finance voted 13-6 to
support the FCC reform bill that would have restricted FCC
regulatory authority. However, the bill died with the end of
the 104th Congress. In any event, the bill was notable beTICHANNEL NEWS,

cause of the views - and prominence - of its opponents.
48

Smut Out-of-Line Online, Family Research Council,
Vol. 7, No. 4 (1996).
Garry Abrams, supra note 29, at 20-21.
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present-day postal system." Most importantly, he
concluded that "[s]peech will not be free if these
[technologies] are not also free."50
Noting the "insidious bent"5 ' of prior regulatory justifications that "outlive their need [and]
tend to spread," 52 Pool proposed four principles
that should guide freedom of expression in the
digital age: 53
1. "The First Amendment applies fully to all media ...
electronic as well as print"5 because the Constitution
protects "the function of communication" 5 5 not just
the means used to transmit it;
2. "There may be no licensing [and] no scrutiny of
who may produce or sell publications or information in
any form;"5 6
3. Any "enforcement of the law must be after the fact,
not by prior restraint;" 5 7
4. "[R]egulation [must be applied only as] a last recourse .

. .

. [and] the burden of proof is for the least

possible regulation of communication."

58

These four principles are the antithesis of the
culture of regulation, and it is small wonder that
the political branches and their regulatory appointees take the opposite approach. Indeed, the
guiding principles of the regulatory culture may
be seen as: (1) regulation applies fully to all media; (2) speakers must submit to government licensing; (3) government will establish quantitative, concrete and enforceable obligations
relating to content; and (4) the ability to regulate
is presumed, and the burden of proof for the exercise of free speech is on the speaker.
The stark contrast between these two approaches is probably best explained by the fact
that the culture of regulation is motivated more
by political imperatives than by constitutional values. Thus, the special urgency with which the
FCC and the White House approached the children's TV issue was not unrelated to the fact that
1996 was a presidential election year. The long
deadlock in the proceeding at the FCC ended
only after the White House scheduled a summit
on children's TV and engaged in down-to-the-wire
negotiations with the National Association of
50
ITHIEL DE SOLA POOL, TECHNOLOGIES
(Harvard Univ. Press) (1983).
51
Id. at 245.
52
Id.
53
Id.
54 Id. at 246.
55 Id.
56 Id.
57
Id.
58 POOL, supra note 50, at 246.
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Broadcasters. 59 These issues, including the V-chip
and the new FCC rules, were a key part of President Clinton's campaign for reelection and were
incorporated into the Democratic platform.60
Government control over the media in the
name of children has become the ultimate "motherhood" issue, making politicians quake lest they
be labeled anti-kid. A July Washington Post headline proclaimed Culture War Score: Dems 5, GOP
0.61 The story claimed that Democrats hijacked
the "Culture War" and "family values" issues, thus
preempting traditional Republican campaign fodder. 62 It characterized the phenomenon as "one
of the shrewdest political heists in years."63
But while politicians and their appointees are
bound only loosely by constitutional reasoning,
judges necessarily must be more focused on such
concerns. Consequently, the judicial response to
the growth of regulation has been as encouraging
as the political machinations have been discouraging.
First, courts have generally been skeptical about
the continuing validity of Red Lion and the rationale for content regulation. Many observers have
concluded that the original justification for different treatment of broadcasting - the purported
scarcity of frequencies - has for years been nothing more than a legal fiction. 64 Along with this
scholarly trend, a growing number of courts have
questioned Red Lion's continuing validity.6 5 Even
with respect to broadcasting, the Supreme Court
has held that the FCC cannot intrude too far into
the editorial discretion of its licensees. 66
Second, courts have emphasized that the FCC's
regulatory power does not automatically extend
to new non-broadcast technologies. Although
59

Chris McConnell, Burning the Midnight Oil Over Kid's

TV BROADCASTING & CABLE, Aug. 5, 1996, at 8.
60 Heather Fleming, TV Gored in Chicago, BROADCASTING

& CABLE, Sept. 2, 1996, at 6; Democrats' Platform Celebrates VChip, Kid's TVDeal, BROADCASTING & CABLE, Aug. 12, 1996, at
16.
61 Paul Farhi, Culture War Score: Dems 5, GOP 0, WASH.
POST, July 7, 1996, at Cl.
62

Id.

Id. at C2.
64 See, e.g., H. Geller, Fiber Optics: An Opportunityfor a New
Policy?, A Report of the Annenberg Washington Program
Communications Policy Studies Northwestern University,
1991, at 15 ("the broadcast regulatory model is a failed concept" and "the public trustee scheme . . . is a joke"). See also
BOLLINGER, supra note 3, at 88-90 (describing the rationale of
Red Lion as having "devastating - even embarrassing deficienc[ies]," as "illogical," and as being based on" the simple-minded and erroneous assertion that public regulation is
63
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"[e]ach method [of communication] tends to
present its own peculiar problems,"'6 7 the
Supreme Court has emphasized that "the basic
principles of freedom of speech and the press,
like the First Amendment's command, do not
vary." Those principles "make freedom of expression the rule."68 For example, efforts to extend
the lesser constitutional regime of Red Lion to the
newer technologies of cable television and the Internet have so far not been successful. In Turner
Broadcast Systems v. FCC,69 the Court explained
that "the rationale for applying a less rigorous
standard of First Amendment scrutiny to broadcast regulation, whatever its validity in the cases elaborating it, does not apply in the context of cable
regulation." 70
Early judicial tests of government regulation of
the Internet suggest a similar outcome. In ACLU
v. Reno,7 1 the three-judge court in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania emphatically rejected broadcast-type regulation of "indecent" Internet communications. 72 Judge Dalzell concluded that "the
Internet deserves the broadest possible protection
from government-imposed, content-based regulation."7 3 Any such regulation, he concluded,
"could burn the global village to roast the pig."7 4
To the extent that "the Internet may fairly be regarded as a never-ending worldwide conversation,"75 Judge Dalzell wrote, "[the government
may not . .. interrupt that conversation." 76

These decisions suggest that the judiciary has
not bought in to the culture of regulation. Nevertheless, these trends raise the following questions:
(1) Is the public trustee concept of Red Lion still
valid, and what are its limits? (2) To what extent
will the First Amendment permit regulation of
the only allocation scheme that can avoid chaos in broadcasting").
65
See, e.g., Arkansas AFL-CIO v. FCC, 11 F.3d 1430, 1443
(8th Cir. 1993) (en banc) (Arnold, C.J., concurring). See also
Syracuse Peace Council v. FCC, 867 F.2d 654, 684-685 (D.C.
Cir. 1989) (Starr,J., concurring) (asserting Red Lion has been
undermined by technological and market developments).
66 FCC v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 364
(1984); CBS v. Democratic.Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. at 117.
67 Joe Burstyn Inc., 343 U.S. at 503.
68 Id.
69
70
71
72

T
74
75
76

512 U.S. 622 (1994).

Id. at 637 (emphasis added).
ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
Id. at 881-83.
Id. at 881.
Id. at 882.
Id. at 883.
Id. at 883.
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other new technologies? (3) What regulatory theories are emerging to replace Red Lion, and do
they justify a lower level of constitutional protection for new media than would otherwise exist
under a traditional understanding of the first
Amendment?
Various theories that now are being proposed
as Red Lion replacements are examined in the
book, Rationales & Rationalizations, from which

this essay is excerpted. 7 None of the theories
has ever been considered sufficient to justify expanded regulation of traditional print media.
They are being discussed increasingly now because of the government's expanded interest in
content control and because it is not clear that it
can count on Red Lion's scarcity theory forever.78
But the regulatory culture embodied in Red Lion
lives on, at least among those who write the laws.

77 RATIONALES & RATIONALIZATIONS (Corn-Revere, ed.,
Media Institute 1997).
7
If nothing else, the growing number of theories being

touted as replacements for Red Lion bears witness to the lack
of faith placed in that precedent by those who favor media
regulation.

